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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a jury verdict finding the Appellant
guilty of one count of Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony after a jury trial
with the Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding.

The Appellant

was tried in the First District Court of Box Elder County on
October 16th, 1998.
On December 15th, 1998, the Appellant was sentenced to
serve an indeterminate term of not more than five years.

The

Appellant's sentence is to be served at the Utah State Prison.
It was ordered that this term run concurrent to any prison
term the Appellant was then serving.
Jurisdiction

to

hear

the

above-entitled

appeal

is

conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
annotated, 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1; Was the hearsay upon which the court relied in
binding over Appellant reliable hearsay?
STANDARD OF REVIEW #1; The decision to bind over for trial
presents a question of law which the Appellate Court reviews
1

for correctness. State v. Rodriquez-Lopi, 954 P. 2d 1290 (Utah
App. 1998).
ISSUE #2 : Did the Appellant's attorney act so deficiently that
it denied the Appellant any resemblance of his constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.
STANDARD OF REVIEW #2 :

Where ineffective assistance of counsel

is raised for the first time on appeal, the Appellate Court
must determine as a matter of law whether the Appellant was
denied effective assistance of counsel. State v. Callahan 866
P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.

U.S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. XIV, SECTION 1:
All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
2

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART, 1, SECTION 7:
No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART, 1 SECTION 12:
In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusations against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband,
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a
preliminary examination, the function of that examination
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
Constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Rule 7(h)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
If
from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to
believe that the crime charged has been committed and
that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall
order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to
answer to the district court. The findings of probable
cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part.
3

Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired
by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination.
Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence:
Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
Rule 1101(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence:
In a
preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be
construed to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay
evidence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant was charged with Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a first degree felony, and with Illegal
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a second degree
felony.

Appellant was charged with a first and second

degree

felonies because of the enhancement of the co-defendant's
house being within 1000 feet of a day care or public facility.
The

enhancements

were

later

dropped,

because

the

State

attempted to enhance the offences based upon a private rest
home.
A preliminary hearing on this matter was held on June 22,
1998.

At this hearing, the court allowed a police officer to

give hearsay testimony regarding another officer allegedly
finding a suspect white powder on the Appellant.

The court

bound over the Appellant for trial based upon this hearsay
4

despite the objections of Appellant's counsel that the hearsay
did not fit a hearsay exception and that the hearsay was not
reliable as required for the introduction of such hearsay.
The court gave Appellant's counsel leave to file for the
court's consideration a memorandum in support of the objection
to the hearsay, however, counsel failed to do so.
The trial proceeded on October 16th, 1998 and the Appellant was found guilty of the amended charge of Possession or
Use

of

a

Controlled

Substance,

a

Third

Degree

Felony.

Appellant was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of no
more than five years at the Utah State Prison.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Appellant was originally charged with a first degree
felony of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance and
with a second degree felony of Illegal Possession or Use of a
Controlled Substance in the First District Court of Box Elder
County.

(Prelim. Trans, p. 32). Appellant was charged with

a first and second degree felonies because of the enhancement
of the co-defendant's house being within 1000 feet of a day
care or public facility. (Prelim. Trans, p. 9 ) . The enhance-

5

ments were

later dropped, because

the State attempted to

enhance the offences based upon a private rest home. (Trial
Trans, p. 10).
At

Appellant's

Preliminary

Hearing,

Officer

Dennis

Vincent was allowed over the objection of Appellant's counsel
to testify that another officer, Officer Gary Gerbich, found
suspected drugs on Appellant during a weapons search. (Prelim.
Trans, p. 10).

The court allowed the hearsay, however, the

court also granted Appellant's counsel the opportunity to file
a memorandum with the court on the topic for further consideration — counsel failed to do so.
prosecution

actually

called

(Prelim. Trans, p. 32). The

Officer

Gerbich

to

testify,

however, when Officer Gerbich was not immediately located, the
court decided that the hearsay testimony of Officer Vincent
was sufficient to bind over the Appellant.
30) .

(Prelim. Trans, p.

The prosecution put on no other witness that had any

personal knowledge of whether or not Appellant had any drugs
in his possession the night he was arrested.
The Appellant's trial proceeded on October 16th, 1998.
The jury found the Appellant guilty of the Third Degree Felony
of Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled substance (Trial
Trans, p. 243), and the Appellant was sentenced to serve an

6

indeterminate term of not more than five years at the Utah
State Prison (Sentencing Trans, p. 4 ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee all persons charged with a criminal offense
the right to due process of law, the right to confront their
accusers and the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Despite these constitutionally mandated rights, the Appellant
was denied (1) the right of due process and the opportunity to
confront witnesses at his preliminary hearing when he was
bound over based solely upon unreliable hearsay, and (2) the
opportunity to have effective assistance of counsel when his
attorney failed to submit to the court a memorandum regarding
objectionable hearsay allowed at the preliminary hearing.
At the preliminary hearing, the court allowed one officer
not involved in the actual search and arrest of the Appellant
to testify that another officer had found a suspect powder on
the Appellant which was later found to be methamphetamine.
The arresting officer was somewhere in the courthouse during
the time of the preliminary hearing and was scheduled and
called

to

testify,

however, when he was not

7

immediately

locateable, the court bound over the Appellant based upon the
above

hearsay

testimony.

The

court

found

this

hearsay

testimony reliable solely because the hearsay declarant was a
police officer.

Because of the nature of their relationship

to the prosecution and the potential for abuse by the police,
hearsay evidence should not be found reliable solely upon the
fact that the declarant is a police officer.
After allowing the hearsay at the preliminary hearing,
the court gave leave to Appellant's counsel, Mr. Kevin McGaha,
to file a memorandum in support of the object with the court
for further consideration.

Counsel failed to do so, despite

knowing that the hearsay allowed was unreliable and should
have not have been

allowed.

By not

filing

the

allowed

memorandum, Mr. McGaha allowed the hearsay evidence to remain
and Appellant's bind over to be unchallenged.
Mr. McGaha f s failure to file the allowed memorandum in
opposition to the hearsay demonstrate a substandard performance so deficient that it fell below any reasonable objective
standard of professional judgment.

Mr. McGaha's failure was

prejudicial to Appellant, and but for Mr. McGaha's ineffective
assistance, the outcome of the Appellant's trial would have
been different.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT BOUND OVER
THE DEFENDED BASED UPON UNRELIABLE HEARSAY ALLOWED DURING
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING.
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution

guarantee persons charged with criminal offenses the right to
due process of law and the right to confront witnesses against
them.

See U.S. Const. Amend. VI; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,

Section 1; Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 7; Utah Const. Art. 1,
Section 12. These are two primary reasons for Rule 802 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, which generally prohibits the use of
hearsay evidence at trial and at other criminal proceedings.
See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.
At

a preliminary

hearing,

"[if]

from the evidence a

magistrate finds probable cause to believe the crime charged
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it,
the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be
bound over to answer in the district court." Utah R. Crim. P.
7(h)(2).

Rule 7(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-

dure continues by providing that in the preliminary examination,

Mt]he

findings

of probable

hearsay in whole or in part."

cause may be based

on

However, the 1994 amendment to

9

article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, requires that
such hearsay evidence be reliable.

see

12

this

(emphasis

added)

("Nothing in

Utah Const, art I, §
constitution

shall

preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by
statute or rule in whole or in part at preliminary examination. . . . ") . The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that, M I ] n
a preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be
construed
evidence."

to

prevent

the

admission

of

reliable

Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(5) emphasis

added.

hearsay
Thus,

although hearsay is admissible in the preliminary examination
to establish probable cause, it must be reliable.
Regarding admissibility of reliable hearsay, this Court
has held that

xx v

[R] eliability can be inferred without more in

a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. . .[I]n other cases, the evidence must be excluded
at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. ' "
App. 1990) quoting

State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah
Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).

Therefore, hearsay is allowed at preliminary hearings and
the magistrate's

finding

of probable

cause may be based

partially or entirely upon such hearsay.
must be reliable

as

shown by

10

But, the hearsay

the determination

that the

evidence qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rules or
otherwise has some other particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

The hearsay evidence presented at Appellant's

preliminary hearing did not meet

the requirements of any

hearsay exception and, in fact, the prosecution never argued
that the hearsay was admissible under any exception to the
hearsay rules.

Instead, the prosecution volunteered to lay

more foundation
reliability."
the

in order

to

"present

further evidence of

(Prelim. Trans, p. 10) . The magistrate allowed

prosecution

to

continue,

resulting

in

the

following

dialogue taken from the Preliminary Hearing Transcript:
Q: (by Mr. Baron -- prosecution): Officer Vincent, you
indicated that there was information from the probation
department?
A: That is correct.
Q: Do you know which probation officer that would have
been?
A: I don't it's not stated here.
Q: You received your

information from whom?

Gerbich?
A: Correct.
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Sergeant

Q: And is that in his report, what you've been testifying
to?
A: I'm reading off his part of the report, yes.
Q: And Sergeant Gerbich is presently employed with the
Brigham City Police Department?
A: Correct.
Q: And in the past you've been able to rely upon what he
says in various cases and investigations?
A: Yes.
Q: With regard, then, to Officer Gerbich, tell us what is
your understanding, understandably through hearsay, as to
what he did and what he found. . .
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript p. 11 - 12.)
When the prosecution called Officer Gerbich to the stand,
he was not found in the vicinity of the courtroom.

Although

Officer Gerbich was at the courthouse earlier and excluded
from the hearing under the exclusionary rule, Officer Gerbich
could not be found when he was called to the stand to testify.
Because Officer Gerbich did not take the stand to testify
regarding the circumstances surrounding Appellant's search and
arrest, Appellant

had no

opportunity

to confront

Officer

Gerbich regarding the hearsay evidence presented by Officer

12

Vincent and to elicit testimony that would have shown that
there was no probable cause for binding him over on the
possession charges.
When Mr. McGaha renewed his objection to the hearsay
evidence after the State rested its case, the prosecution's
only argument why the hearsay had the required particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness was that, "[Officer Vincent]
clearly testified that Officer Gerbich has been a member of
the police department for a number of years. [T]hat [Officer
Vincent] has had other cases with [Officer Gerbich] where he
has been reliable. [B]asically then, [Office Vincent] just
quoted from Officer Gerbich's report about what happened. [I]
think we do have some reliable hearsay and certainly that
indicates that the defendant did possess methamphetamine."
(Prelim. Trans, p. 31).

Upon this argument, the magistrate

allowed the hearsay evidence and bound Appellant over for
trial on the charges.
Based upon the above information, the question for this
Court is whether the sole fact that a hearsay declarant is a
police officer is sufficient to qualify hearsay statements by
the officer as having particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, such as to be reliable hearsay evidence for purposes

13

of finding probable cause at a preliminary hearing.

Appellant

respectfully submits to the Court that establishing

such a

precedent would be contrary to the purposes of the hearsay
rules — to protect due process and to preserve the confrontation rights of defendants.
The role of police

officers

in the criminal

justice

system is that of the State's investigative body, assigned to
gather facts sufficient to successfully try and convict those
persons suspected of committing any particular crime. The job
of the police is to produce evidence sufficient to convince a
magistrate to bind over the accused and then to assist the
prosecutor in convincing a fact finder that the accused did in
fact commit the crime for which he or she stands accused.
task

officers

perform

in assisting

in

the

conviction

suspects is that of testifying for the prosecution.

One
of

Because

officers testify for the prosecution regularly, they typically
understand the information and facts that they must include in
their reports to achieve their goals of bindover and conviction.

Because of this, some officers may be tempted to leave

out important facts or to put a spin on the included facts to
reach the goal of conviction.
were

allowed

If any such tainted reports

to be used as evidence

14

against

the accused

without

the accused having a chance to cross-examine

the

officer or the officer actually taking the stand and swearing
to tell the truth, there would be little protection for the
accused against such creative report writing.
Under the circumstances of this case, the hearsay allowed
at the preliminary hearing goes to the key element of the
charged crime, specifically, whether or not Appellant was in
possession of a controlled substance the night he was arrested.

Appellant was bound over on the charges simply upon

the fact that Officer Gerbich wrote, for whatever reason, that
he found drugs on Appellant's person when he searched him that
night.

By allowing this evidence to be presented in the form

of hearsay testimony, Appellant was denied the opportunity to
cross-examine his accuser in order to establish any biases
Officer Gerbich might have had against Appellant and to elicit
information which might have been missing
misleading

from

Officer

Gerbich's

report.

or potentially
Because

this

hearsay dealt with the key element of the charge, and Appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine Officer Gerbich on
the facts surrounding Appellant's search and arrest or the content
of his report, Appellant had no opportunity at all to show the

15

court that there was no probable cause for binding him over on the
charges.
Appellant respectfully submits that because of the potential
for creative report writing by officers and the danger in allowing
one officer to simply read in another officer's report, hearsay is
not reliabl€^ simply because the hearsay declarant is a police
officer. Because the lower court determined that Officer Gerbich's
hearsay statements were reliable solely on the fact he was an
officer and because Officer Gerbich's hearsay testimony is the only
basis upon which Appellant was bond over, Appellant requests that
this Court find the lower court erred in binding Appellant over on
the charges.

II.

THE APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY ACTED SO DEFICIENTLY THAT IT
DENIED THE APPELLANT ANY RESEMBLANCE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Consti-

tution guarantee persons charged with a criminal offense the
right to effective assistance of counsel to assist in their
defense. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,
Section 1; Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 7; Utah Const. Art. 1,
Section 12; See also

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at

667 at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d

16

182 (1990) .
guaranteed

The Appellant was denied this constitutionally
right

and,

therefore,

his

conviction

must

be

reversed*
The Appellant was denied any resemblance of an effective
assistance of counsel, in that his first attorney, Mr. Kevin
McGaha, failed to file a memorandum in opposition to the
admission

of

the above

discussed

hearsay

allowed

at

the

preliminary hearing even after the court gave him leave to do
so.
To successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the Appellant must show that (1) his counsel's
performance was objectively deficient, and

(2) that there

exists a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's
deficient conduct, the verdict would have been more favorable
to the Appellant.

State v. Baker, 963 P. 2d 801, 806 (Utah

App. 1998 quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578,579

(Utah

App. 1993) erupting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) .
In determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, the court must "indulge in the strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome

17

the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged
action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"

State v.

Garrett, 849 P.2d 578,579 (Utah App. 1993) cgioting Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

To

establish

prejudice under the above test, the Appellant must show the
u

but for the deficient representation, there is a 'reasonable

probability'

that

the result would have been different,"

State v. Baker, 963 P.2d at 807 (Utah App 1998), erupting

State

v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 719 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied,

935

P.2d 449 (Utah 1998) .
Appellant's

counsel, Mr. McGaha's,

failed

to

file a

memorandum in support of his oral motion to quash bind over
after

unreliable

hearsay

was

allowed

at

the

preliminary

hearing. As detailed above, the hearsay testimony in question
is that of one officer testifying to that which he had no
personal knowledge, specifically the events surrounding the
search

and

arrest

of

the Appellant

for possession

of

a

controlled substance by another officer. In failing to file a
memorandum detailing why Officer Vincent's hearsay testimony
should

have

been

excluded,

Mr.

McGaha's

performance

was

objectively deficient, and, but for this deficient conduct,

18

there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would
have been more favorable to Appellant.
In granting Mr. McGaha leave to

file a memorandum in

support of his objection to the hearsay, the court was clearly
indicating

to Mr. McGaha

that

there was credence

to his

objection and that upon further argument, the court could be
persuaded to exclude the hearsay evidence.

If the hearsay

evidence had been excluded, then the court would have had no
basis for binding Appellant over on the charges.

The reason

for this is the prosecution put on no other evidence regarding
its allegation the Appellant was in possession of a controlled
substance the night he was arrested.

This would certainly

have resulted in a reasonable probability that the verdict
would have been more favorable to Appellant because had he not
been bound over on the charge, Appellant could not have been
convicted of the same.
Admittedly, there is always the chance that the court
would not have excluded the hearsay testimony even if Mr.
McGaha had filed a memorandum with the court.

However, as

stated above, the court must have thought there was some
credence to Appellant's objection

or it would not have given

Mr. McGaha leave to file a memorandum at all.

19

By not filing

the memorandum,

Mr. McGaha

ensured

that

the

court

would

absolutely allow the hearsay evidence, leaving a zero chance
that the evidence would be excluded.

The decision not to file

the allowed" memorandum in such a situation can by no stretch
of

the

imagination be

considered

"sound

trial

strategy".

Because the hearsay was allowed, Appellant was bound over and
subsequently convicted of the charge.
After Mr. McGaha so ineffectively represented Appellant
at the preliminary and pre-trial stage of his prosecution,
Appellant requested a different attorney. The court appointed
Mr. Justin Bond to be Appellant's trial attorney at this
point.
Mr. Bond did file a motion to quash bindover based upon
the hearsay testimony allowed at the preliminary hearing,
however, this motion was denied the morning of the trial.

In

denying the motion Judge Judkins simply stated that "Judge
Hadfield made a determination that that was reliable hearsay
at the preliminary hearing." (Trial Trans, p. 11-12).
statement clearly shows

This

that Judge Judkins deferred to Judge

Hadfield's

evaluation

of

the

testimony.

However,

as

noted

reliability
above,

Hadfield allowed the hearsay he had not

20

at

of
the

the

hearsay

time

Judge

determined that the

hearsay was reliable — he actually was undecided

as indicated

by the fact he gave Mr. McGaha leave to file a memorandum in
support of his objection to the hearsay.

Because of Mr.

McGaha's failure to file that memorandum in opposition to the
hearsay, the hearsay was allowed to remain, bindover was not
quashed and Appellant was convicted at trial of the charge.
Appellant respectfully submits that this clearly qualifies as
ineffective assistance of counsel and requests that the Court
reverse his conviction.

CONCLUSION
Appellant's

constitutional

rights

were

violated

when

unreliable hearsay was allowed at his preliminary hearing and
because his attorney acted so deficiently that Appellant was
denied any resemblance of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
The

lower

court

committed

error when

it

found

that

hearsay evidence offered at Appellant's preliminary hearing
was reliable hearsay based solely upon the fact that the
declarant was a police officer.
relationship
State's

with

Because of police officers'

the prosecution

and

their

role

investigative unit, statements by police
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as

the

officers

should

not

be

viewed

as

reliable

solely

based

upon

the

declarant's status as a police officer. Such a precedent might
encourage some officers to either fail to provide in their
reports information damaging to the prosecution or to slant
the contents of their reports to be favorable to the prosecution.
After the lower court gave counsel leave to submit a
memorandum explaining why such hearsay by officers was not
reliable, counsel's failure to submit such a memorandum denied
Appellant the effective assistance of counsel.

Counsel's

decision to not submit a memorandum could not be considered
sound trial strategy in that by allowing the memorandum, the
court was indicating that it had made no final determination
regarding the admissibility of the hearsay.
Counsel's failure was prejudicial to the Appellant in
that had counsel submitted the memorandum, the lower court
could

have

determined

inadmissible.
could

find

the

hearsay

to

be

unreliable

and

Because the only evidence upon which the court

probable

cause

for

bindover

was

the

hearsay

testimony, had the hearsay been excluded, Appellant would not
have been bound over on the charges.
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For the

foregoing

reasons, Appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse
his conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

£

a
day of November, 1999

Richard,
Attorn
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I hereby

certify

that

I hand-delivered

two true and

correct copies of the above and foregoing Brief to:
Christine Soltis
Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Dated this 7~
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Richar
Attorn
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FILED
Mfiv n g /iggo; .f.'t 15

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

COURT OF APPALS
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF PROBATION

°'
-

^
=

vs.
DANIEL HERRERA

Case No.

981100180

C3

Defendant.
On the 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1998, appeared John D. Sorge, Box
Elder County Attorney, representing the State of Utah, and the defendant
appeared in person and represented by counsel, Justin C. Bond.
No legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be
pronounced, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant is convicted of:
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY, and defendant shall serve a term not to exceed 5 YEARS IN THE
UTAH STATE PRISON, said prison term to be consecutive with defendant's
existing prison sentence.
The Court reserves the right to reevaluate the sentence after receiving
the presentence investigation report. Defendant may also file a written
request to reevaluate his sentence after the presetence investigation report is
received.

0£>'"ft

The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and further orders as
it may deem necessaryfromtime to time.

DATED this ^

day of _ c J j ^ _

.19J^

( # £ O F / ^ s BY THE COURT:

&:~M
ATTEST:
COURT CLERK
by JYatAjC^ 3fWwt^O
Deputy'Clerk
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that madod a true and correct copy of the foregoing
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PROBATION TO Justin C. Bond, Attorney for
Defendant, P.O. Box 895, Brigham City, UT 84302, postage prepaid, this

/T^ day of _ V - / H

1999.
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